reduction in pain more than 80% of the time. The bad news was that
key payer policies were mostly either silent or negative regarding cov-
erage. To compound matters, published clinical data was sparse and
interventional pain physicians were not in the best position to advo-
cate for coverage, as they didn't have the same clout with payers that
surgeons had. In addition, the interventional spine space was littered
with procedures with questionable efficacy. To complicate matters fur-
ther, ArthroCare had just acquired Parallax, a small manufacturer of
vertebroplasty devices. This acquisition did not result in the promised
synergies and severe supply chain issues led to frequent backorders.
Could I grow the spine business?
Heading into 2005, the company expected the spine business to grow
significantly, but the prospects for short-term growth were slim.
Increased sales of the SpineWand were primarily dependent on pub-
lished clinical data. A trial was in the works, but results were a long
way off. And the Parallax vertebroplasty line lurched from backorder
to backorder in spite of our best efforts to straighten out the supply
chain issue. At the same time, as the ENT business got larger, its still-
strong growth inevitably started to slow. The sports medicine busi-
ness, which accounted for about 70% of sales, was growing well
below the 20% rate that was considered critical to meet Wall Street
expectations.
In 2005, the spine business unit wasn't meeting its forecasts in spite
of my best efforts. Sales were essentially flat and the pressure was
incredibly high to find a way to grow sales in the short term. However,
there was one customer in South Florida — Palm Beach Lakes
Surgery Center — that was steadily increasing its purchases of
SpineWands month to month.
The local sales rep reported that the growth had to do with an unusu-
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